2010,11: General purpose technologies and the Industrial Revolution by Dudley, Leonard
Max Planck Institute of Economics 
Evolutionary Economics Group 
Kahlaische Str. 10  
07745 Jena, Germany 
Fax: ++49-3641-686868 
 
 
The Papers on Economics and Evolution are edited by the 
Evolutionary Economics Group, MPI Jena. For editorial correspondence, 
please contact: evopapers@econ.mpg.de 
 
ISSN 1430-4716 
 
 by the author 
 
# 1011 
 
General Purpose Technologies and  
the Industrial Revolution 
 
 
by 
 
Leonard Dudley 
 
 
 #1011 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 1 
 
 
 
 
GENERAL PURPOSE TECHNOLOGIES AND 
 
THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 
 
 
Leonard Dudley* 
 
Université de Montréal 
 
19 April 2010 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Did breakthroughs in core processes during the Industrial Revolution tend to generate further 
innovations in downstream technologies? Here a theoretical model examines the effect of a 
political shock on a non-innovating society in which there is high potential willingness to 
cooperate. The result is regional specialization in the innovation process by degree of 
cooperation. Tests with a zero-inflated Poisson specification indicate that 116 important 
innovations between 1700 and 1849 may be grouped into three categories: (1) General 
Purpose Technologies (GPTs) tended to be generated in large states with standardized 
languages following transition to pluralistic political systems; (2) GPTs in turn generated 
spillovers for their regions in technologies where cooperation was necessary to integrate 
distinct fields of expertise; (3) however, GPTs discouraged downstream innovation in their 
regions where such direct cooperation was not required. 
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The concept of General Purpose Technology (GPT) proposed by Bresnahan and 
Trajtenberg (1995) has generated considerable interest among those who formulate industrial 
policy. Such innovations promise to generate waves of induced innovation in a variety of 
industries that either use or further develop their techniques (Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar, 2005, 
97). The subsidizing of GPTs therefore offers a potentially promising way to generate jobs 
and accelerate economic growth. As examples, observers frequently refer to such famous 
inventions of the Industrial Revolution as the steam engine, smelting with coke and 
mechanized cotton spinning. But did these and later similar innovations actually produce 
externalities for the regions that generated them? To date, what little evidence exists comes 
from a much later period and provides scant support for the promise of spillovers. 
One notable characteristic of the famous inventions mentioned above is that they were 
all the result of collaboration between individuals with quite different sets of skills.1
The study brings together two threads of literature. One strand has sought to explain 
why the Industrial Revolution began in Britain before spreading a half-century later to 
continental Europe and North America. Until recently, explanations of the Industrial 
Revolution in Great Britain have focused on the institutions that England and Scotland had 
developed by the beginning of the eighteenth century. Among these were effective legal 
codes, educational systems that promoted literacy, efficient transport networks, 
commercialized agriculture, sound public finances and openness to trade.
 This 
paper examines the possibility that the principal spillovers from these and other GPTs took 
the form not of inducing downstream innovation in related technologies but rather of 
increasing the willingness of potential entrepreneurs to cooperate with one another. 
Specifically, the objectives of this study are: (1) to explain the timing and location of nine 
General Purpose Technologies developed between 1700 and 1850; (2) to test for the presence 
of spillovers from these GPTs to over 100 other innovations that have been identified by 
historians of technology; (3) to assess the importance of learning to cooperate relative to the 
list of preconditions for growth proposed by other researchers.  
2
                                                          
1 The atmospheric steam engine was developed by a hardware merchant, Thomas Newcomen, and a plumber, 
John Calley (Rolt and Allen, 1977, 34, 35), while casting with coke-smelted iron was the invention of  a malt-
mill manufacturer, Abraham Darby, and a young ironworker, John Thomas  (Rolt, 1962, 8); spinning with rollers 
was a collaborative effort of a designer of machinery, Lewis Paul, and a carpenter, John Wyatt (Prosser, 2004).  
 Mokyr (2002, 
2 Rostow (1960) argued that such developments were preconditions for economic growth. North and Weingast 
(1989) offered an explanation for their effects, arguing that Britain’s institutions allowed its government to 
commit itself to respecting property rights. Mokyr (1999, 29) suggested that rather than talk of necessary 
conditions for industrialization, one should use the term, “causal factors”, that is, influences that increase the 
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2010) has emphasized the knowledge revolution that occurred as the scientific method was 
developed and applied. Recently, this discussion has been enriched by the addition of a 
powerful restatement of Adam Smith’s explanation of the British Industrial Revolution based 
on factor prices. As set out by Allen (2007; 2009, pp. 138-144), the argument states that the 
high cost of British labor combined with the low costs of the country’s capital and energy 
provided an incentive to develop technologies that substituted coal and capital for labor.   
Even so amended, however, this general ‘preconditions’ approach has difficulty 
explaining the timing and the location of the innovations that were developed in the West 
during the years after 1700. With regard to institutions and scientific knowledge, the Dutch 
Republic was at least as well endowed as Britain in 1700, yet failed to industrialize before the 
late nineteenth century (deVries and van der Woude, 1997, 712). As concerns factor prices, 
Allen argues that the three famous labor-saving inventions mentioned above were triggered 
by a new configuration of factor prices early in the eighteenth century and that these 
inventions subsequently induced several trajectories of further innovation (Allen, 2009, 135 
ff). But why were all of these techniques first developed in the midlands in the vicinity of a 
small town named Birmingham rather than in other areas of Western Europe with expensive 
labor and access to coal either locally or by sea3? And why did these inventions appear in the 
first few decades of the eighteenth century rather than fifty or a hundred years earlier (or 
later)? Throughout the preceding centuries, people had been struggling unsuccessfully to find 
ways to harness steam power, to cast with iron smelted by the use of coal and to automate the 
steps in the production of textiles.4
A second strand has examined the sources of innovation. Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 
(1995) used the term ‘General Purpose Technology’ (GPT) to describe an innovation that 
triggers a whole series of further technological developments. One of their examples was the 
 Finally, how can the subsequent development of many 
other devices and processes less directly related to factor prices – for example, accurate 
timepieces, the hot-air balloon and the telegraph – be explained?  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
probability of economic change. Acemoglu et al. (2005) offered evidence that Western European economic 
growth before 1850 was favored not only by institutional reform but also by access to the profits of Atlantic 
trade.  
3 With regard to cotton spinning, this paper indentifies as the key innovation Paul and Wyatt’s device for 
spinning with rollers, patented in 1738, rather than Hargreaves’ spinning jenny of 1764 that was selected by 
Allen (2007).   
4 Sand casting of iron skillets was done in the foundries of Sussex from the late Middle Ages (Rolt, 1962, 3, 8). 
Dud Dudley attempted to smelt iron with coal prior to the Civil War (Rolt, 1962, 5). Water-powered silk 
spinning factories existed in Europe as early as 1272 (Munro, 1996, 479). Denis Papin had invented the steam 
powered piston before 1695, while Thomas Savery was granted a patent for a device that used steam to extract 
water from a mine (Rolt & Allen, , 24-25). 
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steam engine (p. 84). In a book edited by Helpman (1998), a number of other researchers 
discussed the implications of this concept. Recently, Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar (2005, 540-
541) used the notion of GPT to explain the discontinuous nature of technical change since 
prehistoric times. They argued that the presence of spillovers from such innovations may 
justify the use not only ‘blanket’ policies such as research subsidies and patent protection but 
also ‘focused’ industrial policy to support specific sectors. For example, the presence of 
spillovers could provide a justification for protectionist measures such as Britain’s Calico Act 
of 1721 sought to prohibit imports of Indian cotton goods by levying heavy fines on those 
who wore or sold all-cotton textiles or used them in their households.  
To date, empirical support for the existence of spillover effects from such policies has 
been weak. Moser (2005) showed that one specific blanket policy, namely, patent protection, 
did not affect the overall rate of innovation. Rather, data from two nineteenth-century world 
fair indicated that patents served primarily to channel innovative activity into sectors where 
the gains from novelty were otherwise difficult to appropriate. Might focused industrial 
policies have greater impact? Moser and Nicholas (2004) found that a strong candidate for 
consideration as a GPT, electricity, actually had fewer citations for its patents from the 1920s 
than did other innovations.  A recent study of US innovations in electrical technology also 
suggested that industry-specific stimulus may also be ineffective. Using patent data from 
1890 and 1910, Lo and Sutthiphisal (2008) found little evidence of interindustry spillovers 
from core technologies to crossover technologies. 
This paper differs from previous studies in disaggregating innovations by the degree of 
cooperation in the innovative process and by examining the possibility of long-term spillovers 
that affect the willingness to cooperate.5
                                                          
5 Dudley (2008) uses an earlier version of the data set of this paper to identify the sources of innovation, but does 
not identify GPTs or test for the presence of spillovers created by them. 
 Section I below describes a set of 116 innovations 
over the period from 1700 to 1849 that have been identified by historians of technology. It 
then separates these innovations into three categories; namely, GPTs, all of which were 
developed by two or more people, other cooperative innovations having more than one 
inventor, and non-cooperative innovations, that is, those with a single inventor. The 
concentration of these innovations in three countries gives rise to several questions that have 
not yet been answered in the literature. 
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Section II proposes a simple model of strategic interaction between members of an 
innovating society in which the propensity of each to cooperate may change over time as a 
result of learning from experience. The model begins in a non-cooperating society in which 
large numbers of people are nevertheless signaling their potential willingness to cooperate. It 
is shown that a shock which temporarily induces cooperation can lead to regional 
specialization, some areas specializing in cooperative activities and others in non-cooperative 
but nevertheless innovative activities.  
Section III uses the micro-data of the first section in a zero-inflated Poisson 
specification to compare this ‘learning-to-cooperate’ model with the more conventional 
‘preconditions’ explanation of innovation during the Industrial Revolution. The results 
suggest that the development of a ‘macro-invention’ or ‘General Purpose Technology’ was a 
relatively rare event, likely to occur under quite special circumstances. Large economies in 
which information circulated freely were favored. The Protestant religion also seems to have 
been a positive influence, perhaps because of its emphasis on literacy and on inviolable rules 
governing social behavior.  
The results also suggest that, at least during the Industrial Revolution, GPTs were in a 
class by themselves, generating externalities for derivative technologies but themselves 
depending little on spillovers from previous innovations. The prior development of a GPT in a 
given region nevertheless had important effects on the course of subsequent innovation in that 
region. There were strong spillovers favoring the development of other relatively complex 
cooperative innovations. However, other things being equal, such a region was less likely to 
develop generally simpler non-cooperative innovations.  
The empirical results might also have implications for yet another explanation of the 
Industrial Revolution. De Vries (2008) suggested that the availability of new consumption 
goods may have increased people’s willingness to work, thereby increasing the effective 
industrial labor force. However, it would be worthwhile to explore causality in the opposite 
direction, namely, that the new spirit of cooperation within national boundaries may have 
enlarged the reference group with respect to which people set their consumption preferences. 
Finally, a possible policy implication of these results is that attempts to promote GPTs 
in one region may alter the future comparative advantage of both this and other regions. 
Collective research activities may be favored in the region in question, but other more 
individualistic innovative efforts may be displaced elsewhere.     
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I. GPTS AND INNOVATION, 1700-1850 
 
‘About 1760 a wave of gadgets swept over England,’ wrote a schoolboy cited in T. S. 
Aston’s concise study of the transformation of British Industry between mid-eighteenth and 
mid-nineteenth centuries (Ashton, 1948/1962, 58). Most observers of the Industrial 
Revolution would agree, however, that not all of these gadgets were created equal. This 
section is therefore divided into three parts. First, it presents 116 of these inventions that have 
been identified as important by historians of technology. In the second part a subset of these 
important innovations, described as ‘macro-inventions’ or ‘General Purpose Technologies,’ is 
selected for particular attention. Nine such technologies are described briefly. Finally, many 
of the 107 other important inventions share an important characteristic with the GPTs, 
namely, that they were produced through the cooperation of two or more unrelated 
individuals. The third part therefore compares the timing and location of new developments 
according to the degree of cooperation in the innovation process. 
 
(a) Innovation  
 
What does one mean by innovation and by Industrial Revolution? The definition of 
what constitutes innovation, as Thomas Kuhn (1962, 162-163) explained, is bound to be 
subjective. Fortunately, generations of historians of technology have polished and refined this 
definition. There is general agreement that an industrial innovation must incorporate 
something significantly new, that it must consist of a production process (such as coke 
smelting) or a product (such as the locomotive), and that it must be effectively applied. To 
avoid bias in favor of discoveries made in particular countries, this study has chosen recent 
accounts of the industrial revolution by recognized experts of four different nationalities.6
                                                          
6 In studying the characteristics of American “great inventors”, Khan and Sokoloff (2004) used a method similar 
to that of this paper. They studied the U.S. patents awarded to those sufficiently important to be described as 
inventors in the Dictionary of American Biography, Scribner’s, 1928-1936. Their approach has been criticized 
by MacLeod and Nuvolari (2006) for its possible biases, for example, an excessive emphasis on instruments, on 
the military and on steam power, combined with a neglect of chemicals, consumer goods and non-steam power. 
However, a glance at Appendix B will show that such biases seem to have been reduced here, owing to the use 
of more recent, technology-oriented sources.  
 
These were Cardwell (1972/1991) of England, Daumas (1979) of France, Mokyr (1990) born 
in the Netherlands and living in the United States, and Paulinyi (1989), born in Hungary and 
residing in Germany. To be considered an innovation here, a technological development had 
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to be mentioned by at least two of these authors. Although the overlap between the four was 
considerable, the Encyclopedia Britannica served as arbitrator in the cases of a reference by a 
single author.7
If we are to define the Industrial Revolution as a sustained acceleration in the rate of 
innovation, the choice of time period is important. As Cameron (1993: 165-166) has 
explained, the dates initially chosen by Arnold Toynbee for his Lectures on the Industrial 
Revolution, from 1760 to 1820, were simply the years of the reign of George III. There seems 
general agreement that there were important technological developments in the decades that 
preceded this period, for example, the use of coke for iron smelting and the atmospheric 
engine.  In addition, the process of discovery by skilled craftsmen continued essentially 
unchanged beyond the reign of George III until the mid-nineteenth century, when formal 
scientific research first began to determine the pace and direction of technological change. 
Accordingly, let us focus on the century and a half that began in 1700.  
 It should be emphasized too that all of these developments are what Rosenberg 
(1994: 14-15) categorizes as major innovations rather than examples of the countless minor 
modifications made to existing techniques. 
 What, then, were the technological developments that occurred between 1700 and 
1849 and were mentioned by at least two of the chosen quartet of historians of technology? 
Our criteria yielded the 116 innovations presented in Appendix B and summarized in the 
section entitled ‘All innovations’ of Table 1. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here.] 
 
(b) General Purpose Technologies 
 
The question addressed in this paper is whether there were dynamic linkages from 
some of these innovations to others. Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar (2005; 96, 98) defined a GPT 
as a ‘generic product, or process, or organizational form’ that generates spillovers, expanding 
‘the space of possible inventions and innovations,’ and ‘creating myriad new opportunities for 
profitable capital investments.’ The authors cited the steam engine and the factory system as 
examples of GPTs. Allen (2009, 136-137) used a similar term, ‘macro-invention,’ to describe 
developments that ‘set in train long trajectories of advance that resulted in great increases in 
                                                          
7 The Encyclopedia Britannica was one of the two primary sources for 30 of the 116 innovations.  
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productivity.’ He offered three examples, namely, the steam engine, the cotton mill and the 
coke-fired blast furnace, each of which appeared in the first half of the eighteenth century.8
Over the following century, between 1750 and 1799, there were three other 
technologies developed that for many observers satisfy the definition of GPT or macro-
invention. In England in the 1790s there was the development of machine tools, that is, 
machines able to produce the metallic parts for other machines by the controlled removal of 
metal (Daumas, 1979, 106-107; Rosenberg, 1994, 15). At about the same time, in France, one 
of the first applications of science to industry yielded a chemical factory that produce soda ash 
from salt (Daumas, 1979, 564-567; Chow and Chow, 1992, 108-109). Meanwhile in the 
United States, the concept of continuous-flow production was first successfully applied to 
build an automatic flour mill (Mokyr, 1990, 137;Ferguson, 1980, 13-28). 
 
The first half of the nineteenth century saw the development of three further 
technologies that subsequently transformed the economy of the West. In France, numerically 
controlled production was developed for the weaving of silk (Essinger, 2004). Two decades 
later, American inventors developed the technology to produce interchangeable parts for the 
manufacture of pistols (Muir, 2000, 129). Finally, the electric telegraph, developed in England 
in 1837, was the first successful application of electricity to do work – in this case, moving 
pointing needles in a device that could transmit information almost instantly over long 
distances (Mokyr, 1990, 123). 
 
(c) Cooperation 
 
One interesting feature of each of these nine GPTs is that they were developed through 
the collaboration of two or more individuals. Cooperation in innovation is potentially a two-
edged sword. An inventor may find it useful to bring a second person with access to a 
different set of information into the development process. However, with this contribution 
will come the burden of coordination to assure that the efforts of both principals are 
complementary and to make sure that the costs and benefits are divided fairly between them. 
 What was the importance of cooperation during the Industrial Revolution? Many of 
the other 107 innovations listed in Appendix B resembled the GPTs just described in that they 
too were developed through the collaboration of unrelated individuals. An important example 
                                                          
8 Allen (2009, 135). 
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is the collaboration between Friedrich Koenig and Andreas Bauer that produced the steam-
powered printing press. With the help of available records, it was possible to identify 50 other 
non-GPTs that resulted from the sharing of original ideas and technological expertise between 
two (or more) unrelated individuals.9 In other words, including GPTs, these records show that 
slightly over half the total innovations identified involved what Trivers (1985: 48) has defined 
as reciprocal altruism.10
The remaining innovations listed in Appendix B were the result of the efforts of a 
single principal. For example, Oersted’s 1819 discovery of the principle of the galvanometer 
occurred during an evening lecture he was giving on electricity and magnetism at the 
University of Copenhagen.  
 These “cooperative” inventions are underlined in Appendix B.  
Three features stand out in Table 1, namely, the timing of the new developments, the 
geographic limits to sustained innovation, and the differences across countries in the degree of 
cooperation. The process of innovation that drove the Industrial Revolution occurred 
sequentially by region, beginning suddenly in Great Britain in the first half of the eighteenth 
century and accelerating in the second half of the century. Then, after a delay of over a half-
century, the phenomenon spread to France and the United States. In per-capita terms, as the 
bottom lines in Table 1 indicate, in all three innovating countries, the peak period was the last 
half of the eighteenth century. Once systematic innovation started in these countries, however, 
the process continued on its own momentum. In none of the principal innovating countries did 
the rate of innovation fall back to negligible levels after the initial acceleration. 
A second striking feature of the innovation process summarized in Table 1 is its 
geographic limits. The phenomenon was restricted essentially to three states, namely, the 
United Kingdom, France and the United States. The territories of present-day Germany and 
Italy, each with a population in the year 1700 that was considerably larger than that of the 
United Kingdom, contributed very little to the total number of innovations. The Netherlands, 
Europe’s richest state in per-capita terms in 1700, did not produce a single important 
innovation over the following century and a half. As for the remaining 90 percent of the 
world’s population, apart from Switzerland and Demark, they too contributed nothing to this 
technological revolution. Among the three principal innovating countries, the distribution was 
by no means uniform. Although France contributed about 20 per cent of the total number of 
                                                          
9 The contribution of an assistant who simply executed instructions is not counted as cooperation. 
10 A detailed search for biographical data on the inventors of each of the 116 new technologies was carried out 
by means of an internet search engine. The addresses of the numerous sites consulted are available from the 
author upon request. 
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new technologies, its rate of innovation per capita was roughly one-fifth that of Great Britain 
and the United States. 
There is a final feature of Table 1 that is worth noting. All of the innovations outside 
the three principal countries were solo efforts, and in France, barely a third of the innovations 
involved cooperation. In the two Anglo-Saxon countries, however, over half of the new 
techniques were the result of cooperative efforts. Despite this high revealed willingness to 
cooperate, Britain and after 1750, the United States, produced far more non-cooperative 
innovations per capita than any other Western states. In other words, those countries whose 
citizens were most inclined to cooperate were also the most capable of producing non-
cooperative innovations!  
In summary, this initial examination of the data on innovation between 1700 and 1850 
suggests several points that should be explained. First, why did Britain and subsequently 
France and the United States suddenly develop the capacity to created General Purpose 
Technologies? Second, was there a link between these GPTs and the subsequent increase in 
the observed production of other cooperative innovations in these countries but not elsewhere 
in the West? Finally, why was there also a sharp increase in the number of non-cooperative 
technologies invented in these three countries?  
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II. COOPERATING TO INNOVATE 
 
The preceding section indicated that societies which were able to foster cooperation in 
innovation tended to be societies that innovated more. But this specialization by degree of 
cooperation may also occur across regions within a single country. In a detailed study of US 
manufacturing, Thomson (2009, 15-65) has shown that in the early nineteenth century, 
networks of producers who shared ideas and equipment emerged in New England and the 
mid-Atlantic region. These regions also led in shares of machinery patents. How does such 
regional specialization develop? This section proposes a theoretical model that is able to 
explain changes in the rate of innovation by a rise in willingness of individuals to cooperate 
with strangers. 
As Witt (2003, 92) has observed, since innovation involves doing something that has 
not been done earlier, it is difficult to model with an optimizing algorithm. Weitzman (1998) 
suggested that the innovation process consists of combining existing pieces of knowledge in 
new ways. However, to the extent that the required inputs of information are each 
incorporated within single individuals, there is a fundamental difficulty. Freely circulating 
information is a public good characterized by non-exclusion and by non-rivalry. By sharing 
one’s knowledge with others, one allows them to free ride at one’s own expense.  
Consider a repeated two-person coordination game with random pairing of potential 
inventors. If each of the two players has two strategies, there are four possible outcomes. 
Should both players defect, each receives a low compensation, the Punishment payoff, P . If 
Player 1 defects while his partner cooperates, Player 1 receives the Temptation payoff, T , 
which may be assumed to be higher than P . Meanwhile Player 2 obtains the Sucker payoff, 
which for simplicity we may assume to be zero. A symmetrical pattern applies if Player 2 
defects while her partner cooperates. There is a fourth possibility. If both players cooperate, 
each obtains the reward payoff, R (assumed uniform). Since we are discussing innovation, this 
payment will be determined by the reliability of suppliers, by the willingness to pay of 
eventual purchasers of the invention and by the efficacy of the legal system in punishing those 
who might violate contracts or infringe on the rights of patent holders.  
Should the willingness to cooperate of other players be low, R takes on its base value, 
R , where 0>>> PRT , the Prisoner’s Dilemma ranking. Since the dominant strategy for 
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each player in this case is to defect, each will receive the Punishment payment, . In the two 
graphs of Figure 1, the vertical axis measures the expected net gain, Π, to Player 1 if he 
decides to cooperate in the innovation game. In the area above the horizontal axis, where this 
gain is positive, it is in his interest to cooperate. Below the horizontal axis, since his expected 
gain is negative, he will choose to defect. Now define q(t) as the probability that the Player 2 
will cooperate. This variable is measured along the horizontal axis of the diagrams. Since the 
second player is chosen at random from the population of the region, q(t) is also the mean 
willingness to cooperate in the region. In the absence of cooperation elsewhere in the society, 
 will be sufficiently low that the steady-state equilibrium, B, lies above the innovation 
threshold, E, in the upper graph of Figure 1. In the steady state, there will be no innovation.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here.] 
 
However, should other parties prove willing to cooperate, Reward may be greater than 
its base level and indeed may even exceed Temptation: 0>>> PTR . In this case, the game 
is known as Assurance. There is no longer an incentive to defect from the joint-cooperation 
equilibrium (Heckathorn 1996). It follows that to the extent to which innovation requires the 
collaboration of strangers, it cannot occur without some assurance of reciprocal altruism. 
Field (2003: 232-235) has argued that humans, like their closest primate relatives, have a 
genetic predisposition to cooperate with unrelated individuals they think will cooperate with 
them. Experimental evidence presented by Frank (1988: 139-143, 157) shows that on the 
basis of visual and aural clues, we are remarkably successful at predicting who will cooperate 
with us in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game. Appendix A demonstrates that under 
behavioral assumptions distinct from rational-choice theory, social and political 
transformations may trigger a learning process that raises the rate of cooperation in a society. 
For cooperative innovation to be a steady-state equilibrium, two conditions must be 
satisfied. First, players must be informed about the potential willingness to cooperate of 
strangers. Let λ represent the quality of the information about third parties, both within and 
outside the region, where 10 ≤≤ λ . Second, this information must indicate that strangers are 
indeed willing to cooperate 
Let the Reward payoff take the form )(taqR λ+ , where a is a positive scalar. On the 
one hand, if the quality of information is poor (λ=0), Player 1 assumes the worst about 
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strangers. We have the Prisoner’s Dilemma game described above. Even if both players are 
potentially willing to cooperate, because of the unreliability of third parties, each player 
estimates Reward to be lower than Temptation and defects, as shown by the point A. The 
steady-state equilibrium in this state of the world is at point B in the upper graph of Figure 1, 
where all are defecting and receiving the Punishment payoff.  
On the other hand, should the quality of information about other players be high (λ=1), 
the situation is more complex. There are two sub-cases to examine, each with its own mass 
point. Consider first a region in which a shock has raised the level of cooperation above the 
threshold, q*. Given the previous rise in information quality, the right half of the path to the 
steady state will meet the right vertical axis at a point such as C, above the origin in the lower 
graph of Figure 1. It is in Player 1’s interest to cooperate, since Reward is greater than 
Temptation. The steady-state equilibrium is at C.   
However, if the shock fails to lift the observed degree of cooperation in the region 
above q*, it makes no sense for Player 1 to cooperate. The steady-state equilibrium is once 
again on the left-hand axis, where all in the region defect. Nevertheless, if cooperation has 
increased outside this region, for the reasons just explained, the path to the steady state may 
cut the left vertical axis at a point below B. Let the second mass point be at D.  
Suppose that initially a society is in equilibrium at B in the lower graph of Figure 1. 
Then let there be a rise in the quality of information followed by a political shock.11
In regions where literacy is lower, the political shock may not be sufficient to cause 
the average cooperation rate to rise above q*. As a result, the level of cooperation gradually 
declines, reaching steady-state equilibrium of zero cooperation. However, the rise in 
 In some 
regions, where people belong to groups with high levels of education, the cooperation rate 
will rise above q*. Projects requiring cooperation that were unfeasible previously now 
become possible. Among the first projects to be undertaken, at a point such as F, will be 
General Purpose Technologies. Since such projects have multiple uses, they will have high 
expected returns. Then, as people learn to cooperate increasingly, q rises and the position of 
these regions moves to a point such as G. At this higher cooperation rate, other cooperative 
projects become feasible. 
                                                          
11 For example, in England there was a gradual rise in literacy over the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
(Graff, 1991, p. 151, ff). Then, as Steve Pincus (2009) has argued, from 1688-1696, in what has become known 
as the Glorious Revolution, the great majority of the English population reached a consensus, deliberately 
choosing a ‘participatory state’ under William III rather than a centralized absolutist monarchy under James II. 
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cooperation outside of this region may raise the Punition payoff from  to *. As a result, the 
whole left part of the curve shifts downward. Should the shift cause the left intercept to drop 
below the threshold level, E, to a point such as D, where unaided innovation becomes 
profitable, the region in question will begin to specialize in non-cooperative innovation. 
In short, the pattern predicted by the theoretical model corresponds to the stylized facts 
of Section I. The model suggests three verifiable hypotheses. First, the combination of greater 
literacy and political revolution creates conditions in certain regions for a rise in cooperation 
that makes the development of GPTs profitable. Second, as the level of cooperation continues 
to rise further over time in these regions, they begin producing other cooperative innovations. 
Finally, in other regions, where the initial level of literacy is lower, the political shock will 
lead to specialization in non-competitive innovations.  
It remains to determine whether these hypotheses may be verified empirically. 
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III. AN EMPIRICAL TEST 
 
The preceding section developed a ‘learning-to-cooperate’ model of innovation that 
contrasted with the ‘preconditions’ approach to the Industrial Revolution described in the 
introduction. The latter emphasizes institutions and factor prices, whereas the former posits a 
cultural transformation. This section reports the results of tests of these alternative approaches 
that were carried out on cross-section time-series data. The 116 innovations described in 
Section I were matched with 201 urban regions of Western Europe and North America for the 
three fifty-year sub-periods between 1700 and 1849. 
  
(a) The Zero-inflated Poisson Specification and the Data 
 
The spatial clustering of innovations observed in the empirical studies of Allen (1983) 
and Nuvolari (2004) suggests that the unit of observation should be a region within a state. 
The count data will measure the number of innovations of type i that occurred in the region of 
city j in period t, yijt. If we may assume that the probability of an innovation in the region of a 
given city was independent of the number of innovations near other cities in the same period, 
a Poisson distribution is appropriate: 
 
,                                                           (1) 
 
where  is a vector of explanatory variables,  is a vector of parameters and  is a 
random variable. However, since over 90 percent of the observations were zero, the variance 
of the dependent variable in the sample was much greater than its mean, in contradiction to a 
characteristic of the Poisson distribution. To correct for this over-dispersion, it was decided to 
use the zero-inflated version of the latter specification. Under this method, a logit 
specification determines whether a given observation is generated by equation (1) or by a 
process that generates only zeros. 
 The components of  will depend on the hypothesis being tested. The 
‘preconditions’ approach focuses on factors the British economy, such as the 
commercialization of agriculture, clearly defined property rights, well-developed financial 
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institutions, sound public finances, good internal and external transport, openness to trade and 
appropriate natural resources.  One might think of using such variables as wage rates, 
densities of roads, the capacity of ports, tariff policy or the fraction of public debt financed 
through financial markets as measures of such preconditions.  However, the difficulty with 
such variables is their possible endogeneity, since each could be as much the result as the 
cause of an innovating society. Since the individual coefficients of such factors were not of 
great interest, it was considered preferable to use variables that were predetermined. It was 
assumed that Great Britain had certain distinct geographic and social conditions whose effects 
were picked up by dummy variables. Accordingly, DumGBr represented Great Britain, while 
Dum1750 and Dum1800 corresponded to the second and third half centuries respectively.   
Two predetermined effects at the level of the individual urban region may be specified 
directly. Since overland transport was extremely expensive prior to the construction of the 
railroads, we will allow transport costs to be measured by a dummy variable, Port, indicating 
whether or not the city was an ocean port.12
The alternative approach, the ‘learning-to-cooperate’ model of the preceding section, 
posited that there were two conditions favorable to innovation. One condition was the 
presence of a signal indicating the conditional willingness to cooperate of customers, 
suppliers and authorities responsible for the enforcement of contracts in a radius of perhaps 
300 km from the innovators’ region. The ability of millions of people to communicate in the 
written form of a standardized language may be considered one component of such a signal. 
In eighteenth-century Britain or France, this condition would have been satisfied, while in 
Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium or Denmark, it would not.
 As for natural resources, the presence of coal 
deposits was a crucial factor both for supplying inputs to industry and in demanding 
innovations to improve its own productivity. Thus the dummy variable Coal indicating the 
presence or absence of this resource within a radius of 30 miles could be expected to have a 
positive sign.  
13
                                                          
12 The Port variable also permits a test of the hypothesis of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) that access 
to the Atlantic reinforced the position of merchant groups and constrained the power of absolutist monarchs, 
since the results varied little when Baltic and Mediterranean ports were excluded. 
 For most cities in the 
sample, this factor was captured by the population within the boundaries of the present-day 
state at the beginning of each period, Country population. One exception was the United 
13 The first privately-published dictionaries in French and English were Pierre Richelet’s Dictionnaire français 
and John Kersey the Younger’s A New English Dictionary, printed in 1680 and 1702 respectively. In no other 
European vernacular was a dictionary published privately before 1850. 
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States. Even in the late eighteenth century, the American spoken language was still very 
similar to that of south-eastern England.14
Another component of the signal that an individual was conditionally willing to 
cooperate may have been religion, for example, the shared Baptist faith of Newcomen and 
Calley. Blum and Dudley (2001) offered evidence to support Max Weber’s (1930) thesis that 
in the early-modern period, Protestants (and the Jews who sought refuge in Protestant states) 
were more likely to cooperate with one another than were Catholics. Accordingly, the dummy 
variable Protestant, indicating that the majority of a city’s population was Protestant, was 
included in the specification.  
 Accordingly, the populations of Great Britain and 
the United States were assumed to form a single linguistic zone. The other exception was 
Germany, where the boundaries of individual states within the German Confederation of 1815 
were used. 
As for the second condition suggested by the theoretical model of Section II, even 
though people were able to observe that most of their fellow citizens shared their language or 
religion, they may still have been unwilling to leave the non-cooperative equilibrium. 
Accordingly, a shock was required in order to raise the average rate of cooperation in the 
society above a certain threshold. Beyond that critical point, learning on the basis of 
successful past interactions with strangers communicating in one’s language would cause the 
overall rate of cooperation in the society to rise to its maximum level. The occurrence over the 
previous half-century of a revolution that introduced pluralistic government institutions, as 
measured by the dummy variable Revolution, was assumed to constitute such a shock.15
 
 The 
lagged value of the number of General Purpose Technologies in the region, Lagged GPTs, 
captured the importance of spillovers from GPTs to subsequent innovations. Finally, as a 
scale variable for each of the alternative hypotheses, the number of innovations in a region 
was allowed to change with the main city’s population, City population. This variable was 
also used in the inflation equation. 
To calculate the value of the dependent variable in equation (1), two different types of 
data were necessary. One set that has already been mentioned consisted of 116 major 
innovations, each referred to by at least two of four historians of technology whose work was 
                                                          
14 Bragg (2003: 166). It should be noted that Webster’s dictionary of American English was not published until 
1828 (McCrum et al. 1986: 240). 
15 To avoid simultaneous determination, the revolution, population and literacy variables are defined as of the 
beginning of each sub-period.  
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consulted.16
Sources of literacy rates in 1700, 1750 and 1800 were: England, Cressy (1980: 177); 
France, Graff (1991: 193); Germany, Graff (1991: 187); Italy, Graff (1991: 191); Netherlands, 
Graff (1991: 223); United States, Graff (1991: 249). The rates for Austria were estimated 
from the German rate less the German-Austrian difference in 1850 from Cipolla (1969: 115). 
Estimates for Belgium and Scotland were calculated in the same manner from the 1850 rates 
for Germany and England respectively. The source for each European city’s religion was 
Darby and Fullard (1978: 126-127); deposits of coal were from Barraclough (1984: 201, 210-
211). 
 A second set of data consisted of population estimates for 201 European cities, 
each of which had at least 7,000 inhabitants in 1700, from Bairoch et al. (1988). Of this set, 
there were 46 cities at or near which one or more innovations occurred. To these, we added 
the 155 other European cities that were at least as close to London as the most distant 
innovating city (Como, in northern Italy). In addition, we included three American cities – 
New York, Philadelphia and Boston. The city list appears in Appendix C. Since the Bairoch 
urban-population data are available only at fifty-year intervals for the period under 
consideration, we divided the data into three half-century groups, namely, 1700-1749, 1750-
1799 and 1800-1849. 
  
(b) Results for All Innovations 
 
To estimate the zero-inflated Poisson model, the data were divided into three cross-
sections, one for each of the periods 1700-1749, 1750-1799 and 1800-1849.  Table 2 presents 
the estimates for all 116 innovations. Note first that the inflation variable, City population, 
was significant in determining whether an arbitrary value of zero was appropriate for some 
observations all four specifications. The first column displays results for the specification 
representing the "preconditions" approach. Among the Poisson coefficients, both the dummy 
variable for Great Britain and the dummy corresponding to the half-century beginning in 1750 
were significant with positive signs. The proximity of coal deposits was another significant 
factor favoring innovation. As might be expected, the larger the city, the greater the number 
of innovations. These results suggest that institutions and factor prices together have 
considerable explanatory power. Innovation required favorable institutions and high enough 
                                                          
16  See Section I above. 
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costs of labor to make a search for new techniques potentially profitable. It would appear that 
once these conditions had been satisfied, in Britain around 1750, takeoff could occur.  
 
 [Insert Table 2 about here.] 
 
Column (2) displays the alternative "learning-to-cooperate" specification. The two 
components of a signal indicating willingness to cooperate, namely, belonging to a large 
language network, as measured by Country population, and to a Protestant religious 
community, were both significant. However, the political shock variable, Revolution, was not 
significant. Instead, the jolt that shocked a society into producing a large number of 
innovations would appear to be the number of GPTs in the preceding period. In terms of the 
log of the pseudo-likelihood function, this learning specification offered a considerably better 
fit than the preconditions approach.  
  One possible explanation for the success of the learning-to-cooperate approach in 
column (2) is that its cultural and political variables were picking up the fixed effects of the 
Great Britain dummy and the geographic variables of column (1). To examine this possibility, 
column (3) pitted these alternative explanations of the Industrial Revolution against one 
another by including all variables from these approaches within a nested specification. One 
striking aspect of this last set of results is that the time and country dummy variables lost their 
significance. However, the cultural variables, Protestant, Country population and Lagged 
GPTs remained significant. The coefficient of Coal remained essentially unchanged, but was 
no longer significant. 
  One possibility that should be explored is that Protestant was simply a proxy for 
Literacy. When Literacy replaced Protestant in column (4), the log of the pseudo-likelihood 
coefficient dropped significantly. It may therefore be suggested that Protestant was signaling 
something more than simply the ability to read and write. Possibly literate Protestants were 
more willing to trust one another in contractual relations than were literate Catholics. 
  These results offer support for David Landes’s (1998, p. 516) argument that it is 
necessary to introduce cultural variables, in the sense of ‘inner values and attitudes’ when 
attempting to explain international differences in productivity growth. International 
differences in rates of innovation depend not only on economic institutions and factor prices 
but also on such considerations as religion, nationalism and the degree of homogeneity of 
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values. Might such differences also be important at the regional level? We turn next to this 
question. 
 
(c) GPTs, Other Cooperative and Non-cooperative Innovations 
 
  Underlying the specifications presented in Table 2 is the hypothesis that all 
innovations were generated by the same process. However, an examination of the list of 
innovations in Appendix B reveals that all nine developments that were classified as General 
Purpose Technologies – because they provide key inputs for a number of different 
downstream sectors – were cooperative. Examples were the atmospheric steam engine, 
factory spinning of cotton, smelting with coke, continuous production, machine tools and 
industrial chemicals, all of which had more than one inventor. A further group of innovations 
brought together distinct areas of expertise through the collaboration of two or more inventors 
but were extensions of existing techniques. Examples were the condensing chamber for the 
steam engine, the water frame and the mechanical printing press. As for the effects of the 
remaining innovations with a single inventor, defined as non-cooperative, with few exceptions 
they were simpler modifications of existing techniques. Examples are the flying shuttle, the 
spinning jenny and crucible steel. It is therefore worthwhile to disaggregate the data, 
separating the nine GPTs from the 51 other cooperative innovations and the 56 innovations 
classified as non-cooperative.17
The results for GPTs are presented in column (1) of Table 3.
  
18
                                                          
17 See section I above. 
 Despite the inclusion of 
fixed effects, both of the signals of conditional willingness to cooperate, Country population 
and Protestant, were significant. The shock variable, Revolution, was also highly significant. 
However, the lagged number of GPTs was not significant. These results are consistent with 
the theoretical model presented in Section II. In a country of sufficient size, with appropriate 
factor prices and with a potential willingness to cooperate, rapid political transformation to 
establish representative government had a major effect on the capacity to innovate. In Britain, 
the United States and France, revolution to create a political nation would appear to have 
18 Note that because of multicollinearity, the German dummy variable was been dropped from the estimates in 
this table. 
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constituted a shock that pushed a cultural nation (a literate population speaking a standardized 
language) beyond a threshold at which new experience induced people to cooperate more 
readily.  
 
 [Insert Table 3 about here.] 
 
 The results for other cooperative innovations, presented in column (2) of Table 3, 
offer an important extension to this argument. Despite the inclusion of the fixed effects, both 
of the signals of conditional willingness to cooperate, Country population and Protestant, 
were significant. The shock variable, Revolution, was not significant, suggesting that within 
the first fifty years, the social effects of political transformation were limited to areas of 
technology where important bottlenecks were blocking further progress. However, lagged 
GPTs had a large and significant effect. In other words, the opening of these bottlenecks did 
indeed generate additional cooperative innovation in the following half century. This was the 
only regression in which the inflation variable, City population, was not significant in the 
logit equation. 
Yet a question remains: is the positive effect of Country population merely a reflection 
of market size? The results for the generally less complex non-cooperative innovations 
displayed in column (3) of Table 3 suggest an answer to this question. The coefficient of 
Country population is significantly smaller than for the two categories of cooperative 
innovations. These estimates suggest that the country-population variable in columns (1) and 
(2) was not simply capturing market size, for if so, it should also have been equally important 
for all categories of innovations. Possibly cooperative innovation, perhaps because of the 
complexity of its product, required access to freely circulating information whose importance 
was not limited to a single urban region. For example, there is evidence that Thomas 
Newcomen knew of previous research by Thomas Savery and through him of work by Denis 
Papin (Rolt and Allen 1977: 39). 
Neither Revolution nor Lagged GPTs was significantly positive in column (3). Indeed, 
the latter variable was marginally significant with a negative sign. In other words, a region 
that had previously developed a GPT was less likely to come up with a non-cooperative 
technology. This result suggests that as a result of previous experience, there was regional 
specialization by type of technology. Regions that developed a local culture favorable to 
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cooperation tended to specialize in the development of complex techniques such as machine 
spinning of cotton with rollers. Meanwhile regions with more individualistic regional cultures 
specialized in techniques that required a less important modification of existing technologies; 
for example, the spinning jenny or the spinning mule.  
If neither of these politically-influenced variables was significantly positive in column 
(3), why did the number of non-cooperative innovations suddenly accelerate after 1700? The 
simplest answer is that relative to fifty years before this date, the cultural implications of the 
two variables, Protestant and Country population, had changed remarkably. The Glorious 
Revolution had brought members of dissident congregations together to defend their freedom 
to worship. And, as mentioned above, by the first decade of the eighteenth century, the French 
and English written and spoken languages had become sufficiently standardized for the first 
privately published dictionaries in these languages to have appeared. 
The significant coefficients of Protestant and Country population in column (3) 
nevertheless suggest that even solitary inventors would appear to have depended to an 
important degree on the reliability of third parties such as suppliers, clients and the members 
of the legal system. This result helps explain why 90 percent of the 60 non-cooperative 
innovations were developed in Britain, France and the United States after their revolutions. 
Finally, despite being non-significant in the nested specifications of Table 2, coal deposits 
were significant for all three categories of innovations in Table 3.  
This disaggregation by type of innovation suggests the importance of distinguishing 
not only between nations but also between regions within states when examining the sources 
of innovation. Patterns such as the role of factor prices and the positive and negative 
spillovers from GPTs may be lost in aggregate data but appear clearly when they are broken 
down by region and type of innovation.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This study has examined the evidence of spillovers from General Purpose 
Technologies (GPTs) – that is, techniques that are applicable in a wide range of sectors – 
during the first century and a half of industrialization in the West. The goal was to determine 
whether the concept of GPT can help explain the timing and location of innovation between 
1700 and 1850. The study used a sample of 116 important innovations that have been 
identified by historians of technology. Nine of these innovations satisfy the definition of 
GPTs: (1) casting with coke-smelted iron, (2) the atmospheric steam engine, (3) the 
manufacture of cotton thread in factories, (4) continuous production (5) the application of 
science to the industrial production of chemicals, (6) machine tools (7) numerically-controlled 
production (8) interchangeable parts and (9) electrical machinery. Over half of all the 
innovations during this period, including the GPTs just mentioned, involve cooperation 
between two individuals with different capacities. It was therefore possible to distinguish 
between three types of innovation, namely, GPTs, other cooperative innovations and non-
cooperative innovations. 
The development of GPTs seems to have depended on the combination of two or more 
sets of knowledge embodied in separate individuals. Large national economies with well-
educated populations where information circulated easily would appear to have been favored 
– not only Britain, but also France and the United States. In each country, the half century 
following the transition from absolutism to representative institutions witnessed considerable 
GPT innovation, possibly because of a reduction in the social barriers to cooperation.  The 
Protestant religion, in part because of its emphasis on education, also seems to have been an 
important factor in the development of the cooperation that gave rise to these GPTs. 
Almost half of the remaining important innovations identified by economic historians 
also required cooperation. For these other cooperative innovations, there were very strong 
positive spillovers from the previous development of GPTs. Regions such as Birmingham and 
London and to a lesser extent, Paris and Philadelphia, that had earlier been able to develop 
GPTs had considerable success in generating other cooperative innovations.  One possible 
explanation is the development of a local culture that favoured the sharing of information. The 
Protestant religion again seems to have been an important factor in the development of such 
cooperation. 
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As for the remaining category of innovations, classified as non-cooperative, the 
previous development of GPTs in the same region seems to have been of little benefit. Indeed, 
GPTs may even have had a negative effect on such innovation, perhaps by predisposing 
potential innovators with a high willingness to cooperate toward complex technologies that 
required the contribution of partners. Protestantism and language-network size were also 
significant positive factors. Even lone inventors were dependent on the rest of their society for 
the respect of contracts and property rights. In all types of innovations during the century and 
a half studied, access to low-cost energy in the form of coal seems to have made a significant 
contribution. Relative factor prices were thus important, but they were not the whole story. 
Finally, there is scant support in these results for using focused industrial policies such 
as Britain’s Calico Act of 1721 to generate innovation in a region. As mentioned, the key 
factors favouring the development of GPTs would seem to have been cultural, for example, 
religion or level of education and the size of the language network. Even if focused policies 
did manage to stimulate GPTs, there was no guarantee that the regions in which they appeared 
would be net beneficiaries of the spillovers that resulted. Although the Calico Acts were 
intended to protect the Midlands wool weavers, the principal long-run beneficiaries were 
undoubtedly Lancashire cotton mill owners. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Period Gr. Britain France USA Germany Italy Othersa Total 
General Purpose Technologies 
1700-1749      3   0 0 0 0    0     3 
1750-1799      1   1 1 0 0    0     3 
1800-1849      1   1 1 0 0    0     3 
Sub-total      5   2 2 0 0      0    9 
Other cooperative innovations 
1700-1749      1   0 0 0 0    0     1 
1750-1799   19   3 1 0 0    0   23 
1800-1849   19   3 5 0 0    0   27 
Sub-total   39   6 6 0 0     0   51 
Non-cooperative innovations 
1700-1749      6   2 0 1 0    0     9 
1750-1799   14   7 1 1 0    2   25 
1800-1849   13   5 2 0 1    1   22 
Sub-total   33 14 3 2 1    3   56 
All innovations 
1700-1749   10   2   0 1 0    0   13 
1750-1799   34 11   3 1 0    2   51 
1800-1849   33   9   8 0 1    1   52 
Total   77 22 11 2 1    3 116 
Cooperative innovations per million inhabitants at beginning of period 
1700-1749 0.4    0    0    0    0    0 0.1 
1750-1799 1.3 0.2 0.8    0    0    0 0.3 
1800-1849 0.8 0.1 0.9    0    0    0 0.3 
Non-cooperative innovations per million inhabitants at beginning of period 
1700-1749 0.6 0.1    0 0.1    0    0 0.1 
1750-1799 0.9 0.3 0.4 0.1    0 0.2 0.3 
1800-1849 0.5 0.2 0.3    0 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Total innovations per million inhabitants at beginning of period 
1700-1749 1.1 0.1    0 0.1    0    0 0.2 
1750-1799 2.2 0.4 1.2 0.1    0 0.2 0.5 
1800-1849 1.3 0.3 1.2    0 0.1 0.1 0.5 
Sources: see section III (a) of text. 
a Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, Switzerland. 
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Table 2. Zero-inflated Poisson regressions for all innovations, 1700-1850 
 
 
Variable 
(1) 
Precon-
ditions  
(2) 
Learning to 
cooperate 
(3) 
Nested  
(4) 
Nested with 
literacy 
Poisson     
DumGBr     1.429* 
(2.08) 
   0.240 
(0.40) 
      1.570** 
(3.41) 
Dum1750     1.055* 
(2.20) 
  0.411 
(0.80) 
  0.621 
(1.28) 
  0.216 
(0.43) 
Dum1800    0.641 
(1.48) 
  -1.042* 
(1.91) 
-0.898  
(1.33) 
  -1.245*  
(1.79) 
City pop’n      3.173** 
(4.35) 
     2.489** 
(5.14) 
     3.468**     
(3.96) 
     3.354**     
(3.87) 
Coal    0.884* 
(2.09) 
   0.793 
(1.31) 
  0.760 
(1.40) 
Port  -0.230 
(0.47) 
 -0.529 
(1.00) 
-0.354 
(0.75) 
Protestant       2.219** 
(3.61) 
      2.310** 
(3.87) 
    
 
Country pop’n       0.124** 
(6.09) 
     0.130** 
(3.74) 
     0.089** 
(3.29) 
Revolution    0.263  
(0.53) 
    0.769* 
(1.80) 
    0.853* 
(1.87) 
Lagged  GPTs        0.609** 
(4.72) 
     0.415** 
(3.05) 
     0.505** 
(3.50) 
Literacy         3.336** 
(2.82) 
Constant     -2.025** 
(3.11) 
     -4.301** 
(4.84) 
    -5.115** 
(5.25) 
    -4.703** 
(4.97) 
Logit     
City pop’n     -38.4** 
(2.67) 
   -48.2** 
(2.67) 
     -60.8* 
(2.05) 
   -52.9** 
      (2.47) 
Constant       2.190** 
(3.96) 
   2.042** 
(4.10) 
    1.870** 
(3.06) 
     1.832** 
(2.93) 
Log pseudo-
likelihood 
 
-198.7 
 
-177.4 
 
-167.5 
 
-171.4 
Time-series cross-section of 201 cities for 1700-1749, 1750-1799 and 1800-1849. 
Number of observations: 603, of which 44 non-zero. 
Robust standard errors; absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. 
Inflation regressions use constant and Country population. 
     *   Coefficient significantly different from zero at 0.05 level, one-tailed test. 
 **   Coefficient significantly different from zero at 0.01 level, one-tailed test. 
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Table 3. Zero-inflated Poisson regressions for innovations by type, 1700-1850 
Dependent variable: number of innovations of type i in region of city j in period t. 
 
Variable 
(1) 
GPTs 
(2) 
Other cooperative 
(3) 
Non-cooperative  
Poisson    
DumGBr -2.047 
(1.11) 
  0.697 
(0.74) 
  0.297 
(0.45) 
Dum1750   0.795 
(0.71) 
  1.340 
(1.63) 
  0.535 
(0.91) 
Dum1800 -3.283 
(1.31) 
 -0.364 
(0.27) 
 -0.223 
(0.33) 
City pop’n     6.797* 
(1.98) 
      3.156** 
(3.06) 
      4.439** 
(2.92) 
Coal     2.418* 
(1.89) 
      1.188** 
(2.60) 
    1.105* 
(1.68) 
Port              -2.239 
(1.63) 
            0.356 
(0.44) 
                -0.570 
(1.21) 
Protestant     5.770* 
(1.98) 
       2.667** 
(3.11) 
      1.653** 
(2.40) 
Country pop’n      0.244** 
(2.37) 
     0.227** 
(3.79) 
      0.090** 
(2.93) 
Revolution      2.938** 
(3.11) 
 0.693 
(1.04) 
  0.396 
(0.78) 
Lagged  GPTs -0.459   
(0.55) 
     1.015**   
(3.59) 
   -1.323*   
(1.72) 
Constant            -11.120** 
(3.10) 
        -10.512** 
(6.76) 
                -4.577** 
 (3.97) 
Logit    
City pop’n          -41.6* 
(2.08) 
        -55.2 
 (1.45)  
              -39.0** 
(2.54) 
Constant     2.630* 
(1.84) 
-0.491 
(0.13) 
   1.649* 
(1.96) 
Log pseudo-
likelihood 
             
           -21.8 
         
         -63.9 
            
             -120.2 
Non-zero obs.               7           22                 31 
Time-series cross-section of 201 cities for 1700-1749, 1750-1799 and 1800-1849. 
Number of observations: 603. 
Robust standard errors; absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. 
Inflation regressions use constant and Country population. 
     *   Coefficient significantly different from zero at 0.05 level, one-tailed test. 
 **   Coefficient significantly different from zero at 0.01 level, one-tailed test. 
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Appendix A. Learning to Cooperate 
 
Consider a repeated coordination game with random pairing to develop an innovation. 
The normal-form game is presented in the following table, where the base values to the 
payoffs are SPRT >>> . 
 
Player 2 
Player 1 
Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate 
 
 )(taqRR λ+=  
)(taqRR λ+=  
TT =  
SS =  
Defect 
 
SS =  
TT =  
PP =   
PP =  
 
The expected Reward payoff from joint cooperation is assumed to take the form 
)(taqRR λ+= , where a is a positive scalar, λ measures the quality of information about 
third parties in the same region, with 10 ≤≤ λ , and q(t) is the proportion of these third 
parties who are expected to cooperate at time t. 
 
(i) Melioration Learning 
 
If either the quality of information, λ, or the propensity to cooperate, q, is very small, 
then we have the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, discussed above. However, with technological 
change and learning, the possibility arises that a sufficient increase in λ and q could raise R 
above T, thereby converting the game from Prisoner’s Dilemma to Assurance.   
Let the moving-average component of the payoffs change in the following way: 
∑
=
−=+
m
i
ci itptq
0
)()1( β ,  0>iβ ,    (A.1) 
where pc(t) is the percentage who cooperate at time t. 
Under Herrnstein’s (1991) melioration-learning hypothesis as specified by Brenner 
and Witt (2003), the probability that an agent cooperates changes according to the following 
equation: 
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[ ] [ ])()()(1)()()1( tctptptptp dccccc Π−Π−+=+ φ ,        (A.2) 
 
where )(tcΠ is the average payoff to cooperation in the recent past, )(tdΠ is the average 
payoff to defection and the scalar, 0>φ , is the rate at which people learn from experience.
  
Let the number of times the agent has cooperated in the recent past be represented by 
)(tkc . On these occasions, assume that the other players cooperated )(tkcc times and defected
)(tkcd  times. The average payoff when the agent cooperated is then calculated as follows: 
 
S
tk
tkR
tk
tkt
c
cd
c
cc
c )(
)(
)(
)()( +=Π ,      (A.3) 
 
where R and S are the Reward and Sucker payoffs respectively, as defined in the table above. 
Similarly, if on the )(tkd  occasions that the agent defected in the past, the other players 
cooperated )(tkdc  times and defected )(tkdd  times, the average payoff to defection is 
calculated as: 
 
P
tk
tkT
tk
tkt
d
dd
d
dc
d )(
)(
)(
)()( +=Π ,      (A.4) 
 
where T and P are the Temptation and Punishment payoffs respectively.  
Now ddcccc kkqkk // ==  and dddccd kkqkk /1/ =−= , where the time notation has 
been dropped for simplicity. Substituting from (A.3) and (A.4), we may then define the 
individual’s expected net benefit from cooperation, Π , as 
 
).)(1()( PSqTRqdc −−+−=Π−Π≡Π      (A.5) 
 
It remains now to show how individuals can be induced to cooperate with one another.  
 
(ii) The Necessary Conditions for Innovation 
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Under what conditions will people be willing to cooperate in order to innovate? To 
answer this question, we must first explore the properties of the function that determines the 
net gain to a player if he cooperates rather than defecting, and then determine the values of 
this function under alternative values of the technological parameters. 
Substitute the values of the payoffs from into the net-gain function, (A.5): 
 
).)(1()( PSqTaqRq −−+−+=Π λ      (A.6) 
 
The values of q for which 0=Π  are the roots of the equation, 
[ ] 0)()()(2 =−−−+−+ SPSPTRqaqλ . 
Let )()( SPTRZ −+−= . Then these roots are: 
 
a
SPaZZ
q
λ
λ
2
)(42 −+±−
= .      (A.7) 
 
 If λ=0, (A.6) indicates that the expected gain, Π, is negative, as illustrated by the solid 
trajectory AB in Figure 1. In this Prisoner’s Dilemma game, there is a unique steady-state 
equilibrium at B.   
 If λ>0, since SP > , one of the roots to (A.7) will be negative and the other positive. 
The latter is illustrated by the point q* in Figure 1. If in the meantime P  has risen to *P  
because of increased cooperation in other regions, the result is the trajectory CD in Figure 1. 
Both C and D are steady-state equilibria for individual regions in this Assurance game. 
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Appendix B. 116 significant innovationsa, 1700-1849  
Country 1700-1749 1750-1799 1800-1849 
Denmark   Galvanometer (Oersted, 1819) 
    
France Loom coded with perforated 
paper (Bouchon, 1725) 
Loom coded with punched 
cards (Falcon, 728) 
Automatic loom (Vaucanson, 
1775) 
Single-action press (Didot, 
1781) 
Two-engine steamboat  
(Jouffroy d'Abbans, 1783) 
Hot-air balloon (Montgolfier, 
1783) 
Parachute (Lenormand, 1783) 
Press for the blind (Haüy, 1784) 
Chlorine as bleaching agent 
(Berthollet, 1785) 
SODIUM CARBONATE 
FROM SALT (Leblanc, 1790)  
Visual telegraph (Chappe, 1793) 
Vacuum sealing (Appert, 1795) 
Paper-making machine (Robert, 
1803) 
Illuminating gas from wood 
(Lebon, 1799) 
AUTOMATIC LOOM WITH 
PERFO-RATED CARDS 
(Jacquard, 1805) 
Wet spinning for flax (de 
Girard, 1815) 
Electromagnet (Arago, 1820) 
Water turbine (Burdin, 1824) 
Single-helix propeller 
(Sauvage, 1832) 
Three-color textile printing 
machine (Perrot, 1832) 
Water turbine with adjustable 
vanes (Fourneyron, 1837) 
Photograpy (Daguerre, 1838) 
Multiple-phase combing 
machine (Heilmann, 1845) 
 
    
Germany Porcelain  (Tschirnhaus, 
1707) 
Lithography (Senefelder, 1796)  
    
Great 
Britain 
Seed drill (Tull, 1701) 
IRON SMELTING WITH 
COKE (Darby, 1709) 
ATMOSPHERIC ENGINE 
(Newcomen, 1712) 
Pottery made with flint 
(Astbury, 1720) 
Quadrant (Hadley, 1731) 
Flying shuttle (Kay, 1733) 
Glass-chamber process for 
sulphuric acid (Ward, 1736) 
SPINNING MACHINE 
WITH ROLLERS (Wyatt, 
1738) 
Stereotyping (Ged, 1739) 
Lead-chamber process for 
sulphuric acid (Roebuck, 
1746) 
Crucible steel (Huntsman, 1750) 
Rib knitting attachment (Strutt, 
1755) 
Achromatic refracting telescope 
(Dollond, 1757) 
Breast wheel (Smeaton, 1759) 
Bimetallic strip chronometer 
(Harrison, 1760) 
Spinning jenny (Hargreaves, 
1764) 
Creamware pottery 
(Wedgewood, 1765) 
Cast-iron railroad (Reynolds, 
1768) 
Engine using expansive steam 
operation (Watt 1769) 
Water frame (Arkwright, 1769) 
Efficient atmospheric steam 
engine (Smeaton, 1772) 
Dividing machine (Ramsden, 
1773) 
Cylinder boring machine 
(Wilkinson, 1775) 
Carding machine (Arkwright, 
1775) 
Condensing chamber for steam 
engine (Watt, 1776) 
Steam jacket for steam engine 
(Watt, 1776) 
Machines for tackle block 
production (Brunel, 1800) 
Illuminating gas from coal 
(Murdock, 1802) 
Steam locomotive (Trevithick, 
1804) 
Winding mechanism for loom 
(Radcliffe, 1805) 
Compound steam engine 
(Woolf, 1805) 
Arc lamp (Davy, 1807) 
Food canning (Durand, 1810) 
Rack locomotive (Blenkinson, 
1811) 
Mechanical printing press 
(Koenig, 1813) 
Steam locomotive on flanged 
rails (Stephenson, 1814) 
Safety lamp (Davy, 1816) 
Circular knitting machine (M. 
I. Brunel, 1816) 
Planing machine (Roberts, 
1817) 
Large metal lathe (Roberts, 
1817) 
Gas meter (Clegg, 1819) 
Metal power loom (Roberts, 
1822) 
Rubber fabric (Hancock, 1823) 
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Spinning mule (Crompton, 
1779) 
Reciprocating compound steam 
engine (Hornblower, 1781) 
Sun and planet gear (Watt, 
1781) 
Indicator of steam engine power 
(Watt, 1782) 
Rolling mill (Cort, 1783) 
Cylinder printing press for 
calicoes (Bell, 1783) 
Jointed levers for parallel 
motion (Watt, 1784) 
Puddling (Cort, 1784) 
Power loom (Cartwright, 1785) 
Speed governor (Watt, 1787) 
Double-acting steam engine 
(Watt, 1787) 
Threshing machine (Meikle, 
1788) 
Single-phase combing machine 
(Cartwright, 1789) 
LOCK-PRODUCTION 
MACHINES (Bramah, 1790) 
Single-action metal printing 
press (Stanhope, 1795) 
Hydraulic press (Bramah, 1796) 
High-pressure steam engine 
(Trevithick, 1797) 
Slide lathe (Maudslay, 1799) 
Locomotive with fire-tube 
boiler (Stephenson, 1829) 
Hot blast furnace (Neilson, 
1829) 
Self-acting mule (Roberts, 
1830) 
Lathe with automatic cross-
feed tool (Whitworth, 1835) 
Planing machine with pivoting 
tool-rest (Whitworth, 1835) 
Even-current electric cell 
(Daniell, 1836) 
ELECTRIC TELEGRAPH 
(Cooke & Wheatstone, 1837) 
Riveting machine 
(Fairbairn,1838)  
Transatlantic steamer (I. K. 
Brunel, 1838) 
Assembly-line production 
(Bodmer, 1839) 
Multiple-blade propeller 
(Smith, 1839) 
Steam hammer (Nasmyth, 
1842) 
Iron, propellor-driven 
steamship (I. K. Brunel, 
1844) 
Measuring machine 
(Whitworth, 1845) 
Multiple-spindle drilling 
machine (Roberts, 1847) 
    
Italy   Electric battery (Volta, 1800) 
    
Switzer-
land 
 Massive platen printing press 
(Haas, 1772) 
Stirring process for glass 
(Guinand, 1796) 
 
    
United 
States 
 CONTINUOUS-FLOW 
PRODUCTION (Evans, 1784) 
Cotton gin (Whitney, 1793) 
Machine to cut and head nails 
(Perkins, 1795) 
 
Single-engine steamboat 
(Fulton, 1807) 
Milling machine (North, 1818) 
Ring spinning machine (Thorp, 
1828) 
INTERCHANGEABLE 
PARTS (North, 1828) 
Grain reaper (McCormick, 
1832) 
Binary-code telegraph (Morse, 
1845) 
Sewing machine (Howe, 1846) 
Rotary printing press (Hoe, 
1847) 
Sources: Daumas (1979), Cardwell (1972/1991), Mokyr (1990), Paulinyi (1989). 
aGeneral Purpose Technologies are capitalized; cooperative inventions are underlined. 
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Appendix C. List of cities 
 
Germany: Aachen, Altona, Augsburg, Bamberg, Berlin, Brandenburg, Braunschweig, Bremen, Dresden, 
Duesseldorf, Emden, Erfurt, Esslingen, Frankfurt am Main, Frankfurt an der Oder, Freiberg, Gotha, Halberstadt, 
Hamburg, Hannover, Ingolstadt, Kassel, Koblenz, Koeln, Leipzig, Luebeck, Magdeburg, Mainz, Mannheim, 
Muenchen, Muenster, Naumburg, Nuernberg, Regensburg, Stralsund, Stuttgart, Trier, Ulm, Wuerzburg, Zittau 
 
Austria: Innsbruck, Salzburg, Schwaz,  
 
Belgium: Aalst, Antwerpen, Brugge, Bruxelles, Gent, Ieper, Kortrijk, Leuven, Liege, Lokeren, Mechelen, Mons, 
Namur, Oostende, Tournai, Verviers 
 
France: Abbeville, Agen, Aix, Albi, Alencon, Amiens, Angers, Arles, Arras, Aurillac, Avignon, Bayeux, Bayonne, 
Beauvais, Besançon, Beziers, Blois, Bordeaux, Bourges, Brest, Caen, Cambrai, Carcassonne, Castres, Chalons-sur-
Marne, Chambery, Chartres, Clermont-Ferrand, Colmar, Dieppe, Dijon, Douai, Dunkerque, Grenoble, La Rochelle, 
Langres, Laval, Le Havre, Le Mans, Le Puy, Lille, Lyon, Marseille, Mayenne, Metz, Montauban, Montpellier, 
Moulins, Mulhouse, Nancy, Nantes, Narbonne, Nimes, Orleans, Paris, Poitiers, Reims, Rennes, Rouen, Saumur, 
Soissons, St-Etienne, St-Malo, St-Omer, St-Quentin, Strasbourg, Toulon, Toulouse, Tours, Troyes, Valenciennes, 
Versailles, Vienne, Vitry-le-François 
 
Great Britain: Aberdeen, Birmingham, Bradford, Bristol, Cambridge, Colchester, Coventry, Dundee, Edinburgh, 
Exeter, Glasgow, Great-Yarmouth, Ipswich, London, Manchester, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Norwich, Oxford, 
Plymouth, Salisbury, Shrewsbury, Worcester, York 
 
Ireland: Cork, Dublin, Kilkenny, Limerick 
 
Italy: Alessandria, Asti, Como, Milano, Monza, Novara, Pavia, Torino, Vercelli, Vigevano 
 
Netherlands: Alkmaar, Amersfoort, Amsterdam, Delft, Dordrecht, Enkhuizen, Gouda, Groningen, Haarlem, 
Harlingen, Hoorn, Leeuwarden, Leiden, Maastricht, Middelburg, Nijmegen, Rotterdam, 's Gravenhague, 's 
Hertogenbosch, Schiedam, Utrecht, Vlissingen, Zwolle 
 
Switzerland: Basel. Bern. Geneve. Zuerich 
 
United States: Boston. New York. Philadelphia 
 
 
 
